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WITH GREAT POWER COMES IGNORED
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
FAILED TO SAVE SPIDER-MAN
Maya Zagayer
I. INTRODUCTION
In the famous words of Spider-Man’s Uncle Ben, “[I]n this
world, with great power there must also come—great
responsibility.”1 The Supreme Court may be endowed with
inordinate power, but it ignored its responsibility to properly
interpret and apply the law in its recent decision, Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment, LLC.2 The Court was given the opportunity to right a
long-standing wrong by overturning erroneous precedent; instead the
Court unjustifiably applied a “superpowered form of stare decisis,”3
thereby reaffirming the flawed decision.
In a 6-3 split, the Court reiterated the boundaries of patent
protection as it pertains to the exaction of royalties, holding that “a
patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention
after its term has expired,”4 notwithstanding a contractual agreement
that stipulates otherwise.5 There, Respondent Marvel Entertainment,
LLC (“Marvel”) purchased the patent rights to a Spider-Man toy
from Petitioner Stephen Kimble (“Kimble”) and agreed to pay
Kimble a three percent royalty on all future sales of the toy, without
setting a projected end-date for the royalty payments.6 Upon the
patent’s expiration, Marvel refused to continue paying Kimble
. J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Communication and
Media Studies, 2011, University of California, Santa Barbara.
1. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (quoting STAN LEE &
STEVE DITKO, AMAZING FANTASY NO. 15: SPIDER-MAN 13 (1962)).
2. 135 S. Ct. 2401.
3. Id. at 2410.
4. Id. at 2405.
5. See id. at 2407 (indicating that “‘an article on which the patent has expired’. . . may be
made and sold by whoever chooses to do so. . . . [W]e have deemed unenforceable private
contract provisions limiting free use of such inventions.” (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964))).
6. Id. at 2403.
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royalties, referencing the Court’s decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,7
which held that a royalty provision extending beyond the life of the
patent is unlawful per se.8
In response, Kimble asked the Court to overturn its decision in
Brulotte, arguing that the duration of royalty payments for patented
inventions should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in accordance
with antitrust law’s “rule-of-reason.”9 The Court applied the doctrine
of stare decisis, stating that Kimble had failed to prove the requisite
“special justification” for overruling a case, while adding that the
matter presented was one “more appropriately addressed to
Congress.”10 Consequently, the Court declined to depart from the
precedent set by Brulotte and affirmed the lower court’s decision to
refuse to enforce the contract agreement insofar as it provided for
post-patent expiration royalties.11
Though the Supreme Court has the power to interpret and apply
the law, the superpower of defining the law’s parameters belongs
only to Congress. The Constitution enumerates congressional power
in eighteen specific clauses, one of which reads: “The Congress shall
have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”12 The Patent
Act of 1793 (“the Act”)13, which highlights the concern for the
protection and promotion of intellectual property rights, was among
the first to be acknowledged by the framers of the Constitution as a
vital component to the advancement of society.14 The goal of the Act
was to strike a balance between incentivizing the creation of new and
useful discoveries by securing inventors a monopoly over their
discoveries, while also providing the public unfettered access to such
innovations.15 Accordingly, patent holders are given exclusive
7. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
8. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405.
9. Id. at 2404. For an explanation of the “rule-of-reason,” see infra note 62.
10. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405.
11. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–323 (1793).
14. The Act was notable for its definition of the subjects of patents, which still remains
unchanged today: “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter and
any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.” Id.
15. E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at
Common Law, 16 L. Q. REV. 44 (1900) (indicating that patent law derives from “the mediaeval
policy of the encouragement of new industries and the [] early grants of Elizabeth” which
endowed a creator with monopoly over his creation).
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control of their inventions, endowing them with “certain
superpowers, but only for a limited time.”16 Upon that term’s
expiration, “the unrestricted right to make or use the article passes to
the public.”17
This Comment explores the implications of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kimble. Part II discusses the factual background of the
case; Part III presents the historical background by providing an
overview of the underlying case, Brulotte v. Thys Co. Part IV
analyzes the Court’s reasoning in Kimble, while Part V argues that
the Court erred in applying a heightened standard of stare decisis,
thus engaged in judicial overreach. Finally, Part VI concludes that
the Court ignored its responsibility to right a long-standing wrong by
improperly operating under a guise of statutory interpretation,
ultimately impeding parties’ ability to contract freely, and
impermissibly altering the parameters of the Act.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1990, Stephen Kimble patented a toy that allowed children
“and young-at-heart adults” to act like Spider-Man by shooting
webs—really pressurized foam string—from the palms of their
hands.18 In the interest of selling or licensing this patent, Kimble met
with Marvel, who makes and markets products featuring the comicbook character Spider-Man, to discuss his idea for “web-slinging
fun.”19 Shortly thereafter, and without compensating Kimble, Marvel
began selling a toy called the “Web-Blaster” which enabled “wouldbe action heroes to mimic Spider-Man through the use of a polyester
glove and a canister of foam.”20 The Web-Blaster significantly
resembled Kimble’s patented invention.21
In 1997, Kimble brought suit against Marvel alleging patent
infringement, among other claims.22 The suit ultimately ended with a
settlement agreement whereby Marvel would purchase Kimble’s
patent in exchange for a lump sum of almost a half-million dollars,
as well as a three percent royalty on all of Marvel’s future sales of
16. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406; see Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–323.
17. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2403 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (internal citation
omitted)).
18. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856).
19. Id. at 2406.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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the Web-Blaster and similar products.23 The parties did not set an
expiration date for the royalty provision, “apparently contemplating
that they would continue for as long as kids want to imitate SpiderMan (by doing whatever a spider can).”24
Then, Marvel “stumbled across Brulotte”25—the case at the
heart of this dispute—which interpreted the patent laws as preventing
a patentee from receiving royalties for sales made after his or her
patent’s expiration.26 Neither party claimed to have knowledge of
Brulotte at the time of negotiating the settlement, though “Marvel
must have been pleased to learn of it”27 considering “the decision’s
effect was to sunset the settlement’s royalty clause.”28
Upon making this discovery, Marvel sought a declaratory
judgment in federal district court confirming that it could cease
paying Kimble royalties come 2010—the end of Kimble’s patent
term.29 Relying on the decision in Brulotte, the district court granted
Marvel’s request for relief, holding that “the royalty provision
[was] . . . unenforceable after the expiration of the Kimble patent.”30
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit begrudgingly affirmed,
though made it clear that “the Brulotte rule is counterintuitive, and its
rationale is arguably unconvincing.”31 Kimble appealed the reward
for relief, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.32
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
As stated, the Court relied upon the reasoning set out in Brulotte
v. Thys Co. in making its decision.33 There, the Court decided that
exacting royalties for a patented invention after the expiration of the
incorporated patent(s) is equivalent to an assertion of monopoly

23. Id.
24. Id. A patent typically expires twenty years after the date of its application. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2) (2012). Seven years had lapsed on Kimble’s patent at the time of Kimble and
Marvel’s settlement agreement; thus thirteen years of exclusive control over the patent remained
to either be sold or licensed. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406.
25. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406 (referencing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 692 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1161 (D. Ariz.
2010)).
31. Id. (quoting Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (2013)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2405.
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power over a patent that has entered the public domain.34
A. Overview of the Underlying Case
Thys Company (“Thys”) was the manufacturer of a hop-picking
machine35 that incorporated seven different patents in its design.36
Thys sold these machines to Walter Brulotte, a farmer from Yakima
County, Washington, for a flat fee and issued a license agreement
detailing the terms of their use.37 That license agreement provided
that Brulotte would pay Thys royalties in an amount comparable to
the profits accrued in each harvest season where Thys’s machines
were used.38 All seven patents incorporated in the hop-picking
machines expired in 1957; however, the license agreements exacting
royalty payments for use of those machines extended beyond that
date.39
Brulotte refused to pay royalties beyond the patented term, and
Thys brought an action for breach of their licensing agreement.40 The
case went all the way to the Supreme Court, where it was ultimately
decided that the licensing agreement was void insofar as it demanded
royalties after the last of the patents incorporated into the machines
had expired.41
B. The Court’s Reasoning in Brulotte
In making this decision, the Court relied on its interpretation of
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to
secure “for limited times” to inventors the “exclusive right” to their
discoveries.42 The Court reasoned:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as
34. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
35. Hops are cone-shaped flowers that come in many varieties which “imparts different
characteristics and flavors to beer” though their industrial use is not limited to the making and
manufacturing of beer. Farmers and brewers use the aid of hop picking machines for ease and aid
in harvesting hops. Alison Spiegel, What the Hell Are Hops, Anyway?, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
June 18, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/18/what-are-hops_n_5503930.html.
36. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30.
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 30.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (referencing 35 U.S.C § 154 which provides that “[e]very patent shall contain a short
title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen
years, of the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention throughout the
United States, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.” (emphasis added)).
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he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly. But to
use that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond
the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the
monopoly of the patent . . . .43
Accordingly, the Court concluded that such a licensing agreement
was “unlawful per se”44 and thus unenforceable.45
Further, the Court, relying upon Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Manufacturing Co.,46 reasoned that “patents are in the federal
domain,” and thus functions of state law that “run counter to the
policy and purpose of the patent laws” cannot be used to override the
objectives set out by Congress, “whatever the legal device
employed.”47 Consequently, the Court determined that contracts
and/or licensing agreements may not be used to circumvent patent
laws, nor may they serve to extend a patent holder’s rights beyond
the constitutionally protected patentable term.48
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The question before the Court in Kimble was whether to
overrule the decision in Brulotte.49 Adhering to the principles of
stare decisis,50 the Court declined to do so.
A. The Court Shielded Itself with a
“Superpowered Form of Stare Decisis”
The 6-justice majority first addressed the two “traditional
justifications”51 for abandoning stare decisis: (1) erosion of doctrinal
43. Id. at 33.
44. Id. at 32.
45. See id. at 33–34 (“The exaction of royalties for the use of a machine after the patent has
expired is an assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when...the patent has
entered the public domain. . . . [A]fter expiration of the last of the patents incorporated in the
machines ‘the grant of patent monopoly was spent’ and an attempt to project it into another term
by continuation of the licensing agreement is unenforceable” (citing Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v.
Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496, 510 (1962))).
46. 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945).
47. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 31–32 (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Marculus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249,
256 (1945)).
48. Id. at 32.
49. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405.
50. “Stare decisis—the idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is ‘a
foundation stone of the rule of law.’” Id. at 2409 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014)). “The doctrine rests on the idea . . . that it is usually
‘more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.’” Id. (citing
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
51. See id. at 2404, 2410–11 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173
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underpinnings and (2) precedent that has proved unworkable. The
Court concluded that neither of the traditional justifications was
applicable.52 Moreover, the Court found that this case called for a
“superpowered form of stare decisis,” thus further reinforcing its
unwillingness to depart from Brulotte.53
1. Erosion of Doctrinal Underpinnings
The Court noted that “the primary reason” for overruling
statutory precedent is when subsequent legal developments, such as
growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress,
unseats the foundational reasoning of a past decision.54 The Court
concluded that Brulotte’s statutory and doctrinal underpinnings had
not eroded over time because “the core feature of the patent laws on
which Brulotte relied remains just the same.”55 Moreover, the Court
explained that when a decision, like Brulotte, interprets a statute,
“stare decisis carries enhanced force.”56
2. Nothing About Brulotte Has Proved Unworkable
Further, the Court reasoned that the “Brulotte rule” is simple to
apply because “[a] court need only ask whether a licensing
agreement provides royalties for post-expiration use of a patent. If
not, no problem; if so, no dice.”57 Conversely, Kimble argued that
courts should employ antitrust law’s rule-of-reason to identify and
invalidate those post-expiration royalty provisions with anticompetitive consequences, calling for an alternative approach
requiring a case-by-case assessment of the validity of post-patent
expiration royalty agreements. Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that the ease of use and application that the Brulotte decision
provides is not only “workable” but is easier and more determinative

(1989) as identifying “erosion of doctrinal underpinnings” and “unworkability” as traditional
justifications for overruling precedent).
52. Id. at 2404.
53. Id. at 2410.
54. Id. (referencing Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173).
55. Id. The Supreme Court references 35 U.S.C. § 154, Contents and Term of Patent; noting
that the statute then, as it does now, “draws a sharp line cutting off patent rights after a set number
of years.” Id. at 2410-11. The Court also notes that patent laws have remained largely unchanged
since their creation, and that earlier cases which have relied upon such laws, like Scott Paper Co.
v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945)—the decision on which Brulotte primarily relied—
remains good law. Id. at 2411.
56. Id. at 2404.
57. Id. at 2411.
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“when compared to Kimble’s proposed alternative.”58 Hence,
Brulotte need not be overturned on “unworkable” grounds.
3. “Superpowered” Form of Stare Decisis
The Court then strengthened its unwillingness to depart from
precedent by adding that “Brulotte lies at the intersection of two
areas of law: property (patents) and contracts (licensing
agreements),” and that considerations favoring stare decisis are “at
their acme” in cases involving such rights because parties are
especially likely to rely on such precedent.59 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that “[a]s against this superpowered form of stare decisis,
we would need a superspecial justification to warrant revising
Brulotte.”60
B. Kimble Argued Overruling Brulotte Is Justified
In an attempt to establish the requisite “superspecial
justification” for overruling Brulotte, Kimble made two arguments:
first, that Brulotte hinged on an economic error—namely on an
assumption that post-expiration royalties are always anticompetitive;
and second, that Brulotte suppresses technological innovation and
harms the national economy by preventing parties from reaching
agreements to commercialize patents.61
1. Brulotte Erred in Assuming Post-Expiration Royalties Are
Always Anticompetitive
Kimble asked the Court to abandon Brulotte’s bright-line rule in
favor of a more flexible, case-by-case approach based on antitrust
law’s rule-of-reason.62 Kimble argued that “Brulotte’s per se rule
makes little sense” because patent licensing agreements often
increase rather than decrease competition, both before and after the

58. The Court explained that the approach Kimble had suggested would limit outcome
predictability and an even-handed application of the law because courts would have to assess
each case independently in order to determine whether it’s terms violate the Act. Id. at 2411.
59. Id. at 2410.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 2404–05.
62. The rule-of-reason is intended to promote trade and fair commerce. Generally, the “rule
of reason” functions to void “[a]ll contracts where there is a bare restraint of trade and no more; . .
. where special matter appears so as to make it a reasonable and useful contract, the presumption
is excluded.” AUSTIN T. STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS: ANTITRUST LAWS § 40
(1972); Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2404 (2015).
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patent expires.63 Longer payment periods typically correlate with
lower, more affordable royalty rates; thus a patent holder may license
the patent to numerous licensees, fostering more competition.64
Kimble added that post-patent-expiration royalties further incentivize
competition because the licensee has a continuing obligation to pay
royalties, whereas new companies can begin making and selling a
similar product while undercutting the licensee on price.65
The Court conceded that it “see[s] no error in that [] analysis,”
even adding that “a broad scholarly consensus supports Kimble’s
view of the competitive effects of post-expiration royalties.”66 Still,
the Court was reluctant to take stare decisis off of its pedestal. In its
attempted justification, the Court stated that it “has viewed stare
decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the
Sherman Act;”67 thus, if Brulotte had been an antitrust case rather
than a patent case, the Court would be inclined to agree.68 And just to
cover all its bases, the Court further reasoned that “even assuming
that Brulotte relied on an economic misjudgment, Congress is the
right entity to fix it.”69
a. The Court deferred all arguments to Congress
In fact, the Court continuously referenced Congress as the only
body capable of providing Kimble the relief he sought, stating that
this is a subject matter “more appropriately addressed to Congress,”70
and that “[c]ritics of the Brulotte rule must seek relief not from this
Court but from Congress.”71 Moreover, the Court added,
“Congress . . . has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte,
and has even rebuffed bills that would have replaced Brulotte’s per
se rule with the standard Kimble urges.”72 The Court thus interpreted
Congress’s silence as “enhanc[ing] even the usual precedential force
63. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing numerous treaties and articles that critique Brulotte).
67. Id. (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2413 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 2405.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2404 (citing Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 82–83 (2007) (Brulotte has
governed licensing agreements for more than half a century)); see, e.g., S. 1200, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., Tit. II (1987) (providing that no patent owner would be guilty of “illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his or her licensing practices . . . unless such practices . . . violate the
antitrust laws”).
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we accord to our interpretations of statutes.”73 The Court explained
that Congress has repeatedly amended the patent laws, including 35
U.S.C. § 154, Contents and Term of Patent, the specific provision
upon which Brulotte rested, and still Brulotte survived every such
change.74 Hence, the Court concluded, “Congress’s continual
reworking of the patent laws—but never of the Brulotte rule—further
supports leaving the decision in place.”75
2. Brulotte Suppresses Technological Innovations and Prevents the
Commercialization of Patents
Kimble also argued that Brulotte should be overturned because
it runs counter to patent policy—the goal of which is to promote
innovation.76 He asserted that Brulotte “discourages technological
innovation and does significant damage to the American economy”
by preventing parties from reaching agreements to commercialize
patents.77 In support of this argument, Kimble maintained that postpatent royalty payments allow for more flexibility in payment
arrangements, and a more precise allocation of risk.78
In response, the Court stated, “[m]aybe. Or, then again, maybe
not.”79 The Court elaborated that neither Kimble nor his amici
offered any empirical evidence that Brulotte “imposes any
meaningful drag on innovation.”80 Additionally, the Court confessed,
“truth be told, if forced to decide that issue, we would not know
where or how to start.”81 Conveniently, the Court dismissed
Kimble’s argument by admittedly reiterating the “opinion’s refrain”
that “claims that a statutory precedent has ‘serious and harmful
73. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410 (citing Watson, 552 U.S. at 82–83) (referencing a period of
“Congressional acquiescence” then totaling only fourteen years).
74. Id. at 2410; see, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532(a),
108 Stat. 4983 (1994) (increasing the length of the patent term); Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (limiting patent-misuse claims).
75. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410.
76. Id. at 2414.
77. Id.
78. Kimble argued that extending the ability to pay royalties post-patent expiration will
allow for more economic flexibility because parties can choose to either pay a larger lump-sum
up front, and pay less to the patent holder in royalty fees; or, those with less liquid capital up
front, may choose to pay a small fee for the use of the patent at the forefront, but pay the patent
holder a higher percentage of royalties over a specified number of years. Kimble further argues
that the ability to structure the most mutually beneficial agreement prevents the discouragement
of technological innovation and influx of economy by lowering the barrier of entry. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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consequences’ for innovation are . . . ‘more appropriately addressed
to Congress.’”82
When the majority was not deferring responsibility, it was
ignoring it under the pretext of stare decisis, stating, “[w]hat we can
decide, we can undecide. But stare decisis teaches that we should
exercise that authority sparingly.”83 Thus, the majority declined to
overrule its decision in Brulotte due to an absence of “special
justification” for departing from precedent.84 The Court concluded
that Kimble’s claims “fail[ed] to clear stare decisis’s high bar,” and
thereby affirmed the lower court’s decision in refusing to enforce the
entirety of the settlement agreement between Kimble and Marvel.85
V. ANALYSIS
The Court erred in applying a heightened standard of stare
decisis by indolently relying on Brulotte, which is rooted in
inaccurate economic policy, and most often functions to upset
parties’ expectations. Accordingly, the Court’s approach represents a
misapplication of the stare decisis doctrine and highlights an
incredible example of judicial overreach. Moreover, by categorizing
Brulotte as a case of statutory interpretation, the Court granted itself
the privilege of applying a “superpowered form of stare decisis” in
order to justify its reluctance in overruling the decision, as well as
qualify deferring all difficult arguments to Congress.86 Ultimately,
rather than using Kimble as an opportunity to “clear the err,” so to
speak, the Court perpetuated the overstepping of its predecessors’
boundaries by reaffirming the flawed Brulotte decision.
A. Kimble Serves to Reaffirm a Case of Judicial Overreach
The notion that the Court was improperly adhering to stare
decisis was not lost on the majority.87 The Court stated, “Respecting
stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions . . . . [I]t is
usually more important that the applicable law be settled, than that it

82. Id. (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014)
(emphasis added).
83. Id. at 2415 (citing S. LEE & S. DITKO, supra note 1, at 13 (1962) (“In this world, with
great power there must also come—great responsibility”)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2412.
86. See id. at 2410.
87. Id. at 2409.

762

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:751

be settled right.”88 Ridiculousness of that sentiment notwithstanding,
the inclusion of this statement in the Court’s opinion functions as a
blatant admission of error.
The Brulotte Court exceeded the boundaries of its judicial
powers by redefining the parameters of patent law under the guise of
statutory interpretation. Consequently, Kimble serves to reaffirm a
case of judicial overreach by failing to overturn the erroneous
precedent. Thus, by couching its decision on the doctrine of stare
decisis, the Court’s rationale was dually improper: first, in its
misapplication of the doctrine itself, and second, in the flawed
reasoning that the doctrine carries “enhanced force”89 because of
Brulotte’s supposed interpretation of the Act.90
1. Brulotte Is Devoid of Statutory Interpretation
The Act provides that a patent grants certain exclusive rights to
the patentee and “his heirs or assigns” for a term of twenty years.91
Among those rights is the power to exact royalties on a patented
invention.92 The Act, however, says nothing whatsoever about postexpiration royalties, nor does it preclude their contractibility.93
Nonetheless, the Brulotte Court held that such royalties are
“unlawful per se” without supporting that decision with any
language from the Act itself.94
Instead, the Brulotte Court’s rationale was more akin to antitrust
concepts, reasoning that post-expiration royalties would enlarge the
patent holder’s monopoly on that idea “by tieing the sale or use of
the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.”95
Ironically, the Kimble Court, relying on this precedent, stated that it
“has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases
involving the Sherman Act,”96 which deals precisely with the anti-

88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. See id. at 2409.
90. See id. at 2414.
91. 35 U.S.C § 154(a)(1) and (2) (2012).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (indicating “a
patentee may license others to make and vend his invention and collect a royalty therefor.”).
93. See generally 35 U.S.C § 154 (finding no mention of the illegality or prohibition of postexpiration royalties); see also Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that
“nothing in the text of the Act even arguably forbids licensing agreements that provide for postexpiration royalties.”).
94. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964); 35 U.S.C § 154.
95. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33.
96. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412.
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competitive rationale the Court adopted in its decision making, yet
contrarily required a “superspecial justification to warrant reversing
Brulotte.”97
In his dissent, Justice Samuel Alito highlighted the majority’s
erroneous categorization of Brulotte as relating to statutory
interpretation, stating, “[W]e do not give super-duper protection to
decisions that do not actually interpret a statute.”98 He further
emphasized that “[Brulotte] was not simply a case of incorrect
statutory interpretation. It was not really statutory interpretation at
all.”99
Moreover, since the Court’s decision in 1964, Brulotte has been
widely criticized as a decision based on the “free-floating product of
a misplaced fear of monopoly” rather than on an interpretation of
either the patent clause of the Constitution, the patent statute, or any
other statute for that matter.100 Thus, notwithstanding the merit of
antitrust or other anti-competition arguments, the Brulotte Court’s
rationale was nonetheless devoid of any interpretation of the Act
itself.101
2. Kimble’s Rationale Is Inconsistent with
the Intent of Congress
Despite the lack of statutory support and decades of
disagreement, the Kimble Court erroneously relied on Brulotte rather
than overruling it. The majority reasoned that there had not been an
“erosion of doctrinal underpinnings” upon which Brulotte rested,
thus the “the primary reason” for overruling the precedent was
inapplicable.102 Further, the Court defined the requisite erosion as
“either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by
Congress” that nullifies the basis of a past decision,103 yet dismissed
97. Id. at 2410 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
100. See e.g., Scheiber v. Dolby Labs. Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner,
J.) (Brulotte has been "severely, and as it [s]eems to us, with all due respect, justly criticized . . . .
However, we have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter how dubious its
reasoning strikes us, or even how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking the
decision seems"); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1027 (1999) (“Our analysis thus suggests that Brulotte should
be overruled.”).
101. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
102. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410.
103. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
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these possibilities with the sweeping statement, “the core feature of
patent laws on which Brulotte relied remains just the same,” citing
35 U.S.C § 154—Contents and term of patent.104 Though patent laws
have remained largely unchanged since their inception, the Court
ignored a post-Brulotte amendment to the very section of the statute
it cited that specifically concerns the exaction of royalties on
patented inventions.105
On November 29, 2000, Congress amended the patent laws in a
manner that exposed potential patent holders to a higher risk of
infringement by requiring that patent applications be accessible to
the public prior to granting the applicant exclusive patent rights.106
As an attempt to compensate applicants for the negative impact of
early disclosure, Congress expanded the rights accorded by patent
protection by including a “provisional right” codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(d).107 This amendment vests the patentee with the additional
right to obtain a reasonable royalty on infringement occurring
between the time of publication and issuance of the patent.”108
More importantly, Congress specifically defined a “time
limitation” on obtaining pre-patent royalties, confining the patentee
to a six-year statute of limitations, as enumerated in 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(d)(3).109 Yet nowhere in the amendment, the statute, or the
language of the Act did Congress delineate a similar expiration date
on current patents, nor did it forbid post-patent royalties.
Despite this, the Court reasoned that Congress’s failure to
amend the Act to specifically include the right to royalties beyond
the life of the patent equated Congress’s intent to preclude such an
expansive application of the Act.110 Frankly, this reasoning is absurd;
104. See id. at 2410–11.
105. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(A)(i) (“[A] patent shall include the right to obtain a
reasonable royalty from any person who . . . makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United
States the invention as claimed in the published patent application.). See generally Kimble, 135 S.
Ct. 2401 (2015) (finding no mention of amended section 154(d) anywhere in the opinion).
106. Judith R.S. Stern, Reasonable Royalty Damages After Publication and Before the Patent
Issues: Interpretation of Provisional Rights Provisions, BOS. PATENT LAW ASS’N, May 2005, at
3,
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.bpla.org/resource/resmgr/Newsletters/05-02.pdf
?hhSearchTerms=%222005%22.
107. Id.
108. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1) and (3).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(3); see Patrick J. Birde & Nicholas J. Nowak, 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)
Grants Patent Applicants Provisional Rights in Their Published, THE INTELLECTUAL PROP.
STRATEGIST 1, 3, (Sept. 2003), http://www.kenyon.com/media/~/media/Files/Publication
%20PDFs/2003-09-01_Rights.ashx.
110. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (indicating that “Congress has spurned multiple
opportunities to reverse Brulotte,” but that long congressional acquiescence is proof of their
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it is akin to arguing the permissibility of wrongful conduct for as
long and until one is told otherwise. The Court is essentially stating
that until Congress expressly provides for post-patent royalties, it
will continue operating under the assumption that such a right is
prohibited.111
3. The History of the Act Further Refutes
the Court’s Reasoning
The Kimble Court attempted to cement this argument by treating
Brulotte as the seminal case for the Act’s interpretation, proclaiming,
“Brulotte has governed licensing agreements for more than half a
century,”112 and thus the Court “prefer[s] not to unsettle stable
law.”113 Yet, despite its praise, Brulotte’s reign remains relatively
recent.114 The right of patent protection spans over two hundred
years, predating even the Constitution.115 As such, courts and
Congress alike have applied and interpreted the parameters of the
Act for centuries in a manner inconsistent with Brulotte’s, and thus
Kimble’s, understanding of the law.
Accordingly, before the Brulotte Court redefined the parameters
of the Act, courts had interpreted the law to presume that royalties
were not to be paid after the expiration of a patent; however, parties
may contract to the contrary.116 Thus, rather than statutory
reluctance to do so).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2410.
113. See id. at 2411 (indicating that Brulotte’s “close relation to a whole web of precedents
means that reversing it could threaten others”).
114. Brulotte was decided in 1964, whereas patent law dates back to the “beginning of our
nation.” The Origins of Patent and Copyright Law, 23 BILL OF RTS. IN ACTION (Constitutional
Rights Found., Los Angeles, Cal.), no. 4, 2008, http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action
/bria-23-4-a-the-origins-of-patent-and-copyright-law#.UU-OeVdMy3M.
115. Id. (“[The Framers] gave Congress the power to ‘Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts’ by giving an economic incentive to inventors and writers. That power, and the
national patent and copyright laws that soon followed, have stimulated the country’s economy for
more than 200 years”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
116. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Chem. Found. Inc., 93 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1937)
(“There is a presumption that royalties are not to be paid after the expiration of a patent; if the
intention is to have them continue longer, the parties should phrase their contract in language
from which such intention may fairly be inferred.”); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
270 F. 518, 525 (2d Cir. 1920) (“Although the general rule is that liability to pay royalties
terminates upon the expiration of the patent, the parties may contract to the contrary.”); Sproull v.
Pratt & Whitney Co., 108 F. 963, 965 (2d Cir. 1901) (“Royalties are not payable upon articles
manufactured and sold after the expiration of the life of the patent, however, parties may, of
course, contract as they choose”); Bettis Rubber Co. v. Kleaver, 104 Cal. App. 2d 821, 824–25
(1951) (indicating that contracts involving the payment of royalties for patented inventions may
exceed the life of the patent if so intended by the parties).
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interpretation, the Court ironically engaged in an act of policymaking
when deciding Brulotte117—a responsibility the Kimble Court
repeatedly reiterated as one entrusted only to Congress. 118 Yet rather
than correct this unwarranted expansion of the Act upon its
reevaluation in Kimble, “[t]he Court employ[ed] stare decisis,
normally a tool for restraint, to reaffirm a clear case of judicial
overreach.”119
B. Post-Patent Expiration Royalties Do Not Enlarge
the Patent’s Monopoly
A licensing agreement that provides for the payment of royalties
after a patent’s term has expired does not, as the Court in Brulotte
asserted, enlarge the patentee’s monopoly or extend the term of the
patent.120 Instead, it simply creates a contractual right between the
licensor (holder of the now-expired patent) and the licensee with
whom he or she contracted, for the sale and/or use of the invention in
question—similar to any other such agreement not pertaining to
intellectual property rights.121 In the fifty-two years since Brulotte
was decided, courts and commentators have heavily criticized it as
economically irrational.122 Contrary to the Court’s reasoning in
Brulotte, and thereafter reiterated in Kimble, the application of postpatent expiration royalties does not enlarge the patent’s monopoly
because it does not prevent the patented idea from entering into the
public domain upon its expiration.123 Instead, “post-expiration
royalties merely amortize the price of using patented technology
and . . . do not necessarily harm competition because new
competitors are free to enter the market without paying royalties after

117. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2405 (majority opinion).
119. Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “stare decisis does not require [the
Supreme Court] to retain [] baseless and damaging precedent”).
120. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
121. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (indicating that a patent “shall be assignable in law by an instrument
in writing); see also Flatspikes, LLC v. Softspikes, LLC, 913 F.Supp. 2d 208, 213 (D. Md. 2012)
(“The mere presence of a possible question about patents, however, does not convert the state law
breach of contract action into one arising under the patent laws”); 35 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (noting
that the civil action must arise under any Act of Congress relating to patents).
122. Scott W. Doyle, et al., Brulotte Rule Upheld Despite Suspect Economic Rationale,
LAW360, (June 23, 2015, 6:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/670682/brulotte-rule
-upheld-despite-suspect-economic-rationale.
123. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2414; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (discussing the patent’s term
and duration as ending twenty years after the date on which the application was file, at which
point that invention enters the public domain).
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the expiration of the patent, even if prior market participants
continue to pay royalties.”124 Thus, not only was Brulotte
unsubstantiated by the language and terms of the Act, but it was also
based on an economic theory that has since been debunked.125
Similarly, Kimble argued that such an arrangement might even
encourage competition because others would be free to make, use, or
sell the patented idea after its expiration; and, because of diminished
overhead costs, it may even occur at a rate lower than originally
provided by the licensee.126 Upon the patent’s expiration, the public
would have unfettered access to its use, as intended by the Act, and
only the licensee would be required to pay for its continuing use, as
per the terms of the parties’ agreement.127
Jay Dratler, Jr., the Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property
at The University of Akron School of Law and author of Licensing
Intellectual Property, the definitive treatise in its field, added:
It is therefore worth noting that the per se rule of Brulotte is
an anachronism with little or no economic justification. As
one of the few remaining vestiges of Justice Douglas’ oneman crusade against patent protection, it is a lonely per se
outpost in a rule-of-reason world. In attempting to draw a
bright line outlawing royalties after patent expiration, it
relies on formal distinctions, rather than economic
substance, in contravention of the growing trend in antitrust
law.128
Moreover, contracts allowing for post-patent expiration royalties
differ little, both competitively and economically, from contracts that
permissibly provide for periodic or installment payments for the use
or sale of unpatented goods.129 However, the Brulotte Court rejected
124. Doyle, supra note 122.
125. Id.
126. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2416.
127. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2) (indicating that a patent holder obtains the exclusive rights to
the patent for a duration of twenty years); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (d)(1) and (3) (discussing that a patent
holder has the right to obtain a reasonable royalty on his or her patent, and that that right shall be
available only when brought not later than six years after the patent is issued. The language of the
Act, however, makes no mention of when the royalties must terminate or expire).
128. JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, § 4.04 (1994) (Arguing
that there is a growing realization among the courts that “the competitive effect of patent
licensing is a matter of antitrust law, not patent law, and one to be governed by rules of
substantial economic effect, not barren legal formalism. This trend promises, in the long run, to
undermine Brulotte to the point where the Supreme Court may feel compelled to revise or
overrule it.”).
129. Id.
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this argument absent any substantiated ground for their reasoning.130
Instead, the Court dismissed that it was “unable to conjecture what
the bargaining position of the parties might have been and what
resultant arrangement might have emerged had the provision for
post-expiration royalties been divorced from the patent and nowise
subject to its leverage.”131 In sum, the Court criticized contracts
providing for post-expiration royalties as a “bald attempt” to enlarge
a patent’s monopoly, despite decades of economic justification that
prove otherwise.132
C. Brulotte and Kimble Impede Contract Law and
Parties’ Ability to Attain the True Value of Their Patents
The judicial overreach in Brulotte caused an unintended
expansion of patent protection that impedes contract law and disrupts
parties’ ability to contract freely due to the misguided assumption of
patent monopoly expansion—a view that was erroneously
perpetuated by Kimble.
1. Federal Patent Law Does Not Preempt State Contract
Law in This Case
The Brulotte Court reasoned, “patents are in the federal domain;
and ‘whatever the legal devise employed,’ a projection of the patent
monopoly after the patent expires is not enforceable.”133 Building
upon that argument, the Kimble Court further stated that, “by virtue
of federal law . . . we have deemed unenforceable private contract
provisions limiting free use of [articles on which the patent has
expired].”134 The Kimble Court argued that “to permit such a result,
whether or not authorized ‘by express contract’ would impermissibly
undermine patent laws” by expanding the patent holder’s monopoly
of that invention.135
However, both Brulotte and Kimble drew this reasoning from a
line of cases that dealt primarily with contracts contesting a patent’s
validity, rather than the parameters of patent protection post-patent
expiration.136 Thus, while federal patent law generally preempts state
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. § 4.05(d) (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S 29, 32 (1964)).
Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32.
Id.
Id. (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)).
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2407 (citing Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 256).
Id. (quoting Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 255–56).
See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668–75 (refusing to enforce a contract requiring
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contract law,137 the language of the patent act does not prohibit postterm royalties, or the possibility of contracting for them.138
Moreover, the historical application and interpretation of the Act
did not preclude the payment of such royalties pursuant to the federal
statutory language, but rather presumed their termination upon
expiration of the patent, absent a valid contract indicating otherwise.
Thus, contrary to what the Brulotte and Kimble Courts have asserted,
federal patent law does not supersede contract law in this case, but
rather the two work in conjunction with one another.
2. Brulotte Hinders a Patentee’s Ability to Contract for the
True Value of The Patent
The term “royalty” ordinarily envisages a duty to make, and a
corresponding right to receive, payments proportionate to the use of
patented methods or machines.139 This type of payment recognizes
that the market value of intellectual property is inherently uncertain
and unpredictable.140 In consequence, “it measures that value as it
unfolds, in the course of commercial exploitation of the underlying
intellectual property,” thus sparing the licensor and the licensee the
risk of guessing at market value in advance.141 Accordingly, the
payment of royalties as a direct reflection of the use or sale of a
patented invention is the most accurate representation of the patent’s
worth142 and a system of compensation favored and relied upon in a
broad spectrum of business transactions. Thus, the decision in
Brulotte, and its reiteration in Kimble, hinders parties’ ability to

a licensee to pay royalties while contesting a patent’s validity); Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 255–56.
137. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (“[Patent] laws, like
other laws of the United States enacted pursuant to constitutional authority, are the supreme law
of the land. When state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is ‘familiar doctrine’
that the federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied’ by the state law”) (internal
citations omitted)); see also Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964)
(indicating that “federal patent laws prevent a State from prohibiting the copying and selling of
unpatented articles.”).
138. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); DRATLER, supra note 128 (explaining the permissibility and
parameters of exacting royalties on patented ideas by delineating a start date but never an end
date).
139. Bettis Rubber Co. v. Kleaver, 233 P.2d 82, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (citing Eastman Oil
Well Survey Corp. v. Lane-Wells Co., 136 P.2d 564, 565 (Cal. 1943)).
140. See DRATLER, supra note 128, at § 4.01.
141. Id.
142. J. Gregory Sidak, The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J. COMP. L. & ECON.
989, 990 (2014), https://www.criterioneconomics.com/the-proper-royalty-base-for-patent
-damages.html.
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contract according to the actual value of the patent.143
3. Brulotte Disrupts Contractual Expectations
In Kimble, the Court conceded, “the Brulotte rule . . . prevents
some parties from entering into deals they desire.”144 The agreement
at the heart of Kimble proved case and point.145 Marvel agreed to
purchase Kimble’s patent in exchange for a lump sum of about half a
million dollars, as well as a three percent royalty on all of Marvel’s
future sales of the Web-Blaster and similar products.146 The parties
set no end date for royalties, “apparently contemplating that they
would continue for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man.”147
Accordingly, the Court’s decision to void that contractual agreement
insofar as it allowed royalties that exceeded beyond the patented
term not only robbed Kimble of the true value of his patent, as
discussed above, but also disrupted Kimble’s contractual
expectations.148
Despite admission by both parties to being unaware of the
precedent set by Brulotte at the time their agreement was
negotiated,149 the Court maintained that stare decisis was “at [its]
acme” because “parties are especially likely to rely on such
precedents when ordering their affairs.”150 However, the Court’s
belief that there is a “reasonable possibility that parties have
structured business transactions in light of Brulotte” is fanciful.151
Further, the Court’s only support for this conclusion was Marvel’s
self-serving assertion that “some contracts might not specify an end
date for royalties because the parties expect Brulotte to supply the
default rule.”152
Notwithstanding the fact that Marvel’s assertion was wholly
unsubstantiated by evidence, even operating under the assumption of
143. See Kimble v. Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2015 (2015).
144. Id. at 2408.
145. See id. at 2406 (referencing the deal desired by, and denied to, Kimble).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 2417 (Alito, J., dissenting) (indicating that if the parties had been aware of
Brulotte, they might have agreed to higher payments during the patent term, or perhaps are larger
lump-sum up front).
149. Id. at 2406.
150. See id. at 2410 (indicating that “so long as [there is] a reasonable possibility that parties
have structured their business transactions in light of Brulotte, [the Court] ha[s] one more reason
to let it stand”).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2417 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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its truth would dispel the Court’s rationale. 153 Pursuant to the law of
contracts, if parties actually relied on Brulotte to supply a default
rule, courts would enforce the contracts as the parties intended.154
Consequently, there would be no need for the Court to refuse to
overrule Brulotte on the theory that it would upset parties’
expectations—which, paradoxically, is exactly what ensued by
upholding the flawed precedent.155
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kimble Court disregarded statutory amendment that
qualifies overturning Brulotte, thereby ruling in a matter inconsistent
with Congress’s intent and reaffirming a clear case of judicial
overreach. Moreover, rather than “clearing the err,” the Court
poignantly directed all arguments back to Congress’s doorstep. But
as Justice Alito aptly stated, “[W]e cannot ‘properly place on the
shoulders of Congress’ the entire burden of correcting the Court’s
own error.”156 And when the majority was not deferring
responsibility, it was ignoring it under the pretext of stare decisis,
ultimately impeding parties’ ability to contract freely, and
impermissibly altering the parameters of the Act. The Supreme Court
is undeniably endowed with incredible power, but when faced with
the opportunity to use that power for good and not for evil, the
Court’s deflection was too great even for Spider-Man to save.

153. Id.
154. RICHARD A. LORD, 27 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:124 (4th ed. 2003) (“The
prevailing mandate is that mistakes of fact and law weigh in equally on equity’s scales of justice,
making relief available where the intention of the parties has been thwarted by a mutual mistake
of law.”).
155. See generally Kimble, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (explaining how the Court’s application of the
Brulotte rule served to upset Kimble’s contractual expectations of obtaining an indefinite royalty
on his patent, as stipulated by the parties, thereby undervaluing the value of his patent).
156. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–70
(1946)).
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